Tag: Society

Categories
AI Stanford

The Unit of Production Just Collapsed

The lecture was a Stanford CS session, AI-native companies, Garry Tan walking through what it now takes to build something. He’d rebuilt his old startup, Posterous, in five days on a modest Claude plan. A thing that once required a team and a runway. He said it matter-of-factly, the way you describe something that’s already obvious to you and hasn’t yet reached everyone else.

The argument Tan and his colleague Diana Hu were making wasn’t really about AI. It was about the economics of effort — specifically, what breaks when the cost of turning an idea into a working thing falls by an order of magnitude.

Their framing: AI-native organizations running as closed-loop systems, agents with access to the real artifacts of work, able to iterate without the error-accumulation that comes from handoffs and headcount. Revenue-per-employee ratios of a million dollars or more, with live examples already in the YC portfolio. Document processing, logistics, voice agents for specialized workflows.

What I kept hearing underneath all of it was a quieter claim: the mental model of what a startup requires is wrong.

Or rather, it’s right about the past and increasingly wrong about the present.

The assumptions embedded in “I can’t do this alone” or “we’d need to hire for that” or “we don’t have the bandwidth” — those are load-bearing assumptions, and the load is shifting.

I have some small version of this — not as a founder, but as someone who retired into curiosity. The blog, the reading, the daily effort to keep up with what’s moving: each one is a practice in staying oriented while the map keeps changing.

What I notice is that the constraint has shifted. It’s not information anymore. It’s not even tools. It’s the capacity to ask better questions of the abundance, to know what matters when everything is accelerating.

That’s the thing I find unsettling, yet also genuinely interesting: the skills that remain irreplaceable are the hardest ones to teach, and the hardest to evaluate in yourself. Knowing what matters. Recognizing when an output is almost right and almost wrong. Setting direction in ambiguous conditions and being willing to be wrong about it. These were always the valuable things. They were just obscured by all the coordination overhead that surrounded them.

The students in that Stanford course were asked to build something called a One-Person Frontier Lab — use the best available tools to extend your own reach over ten weeks. It’s framed as an academic exercise. It doesn’t feel like one.

But I’m not building. I’m mostly watching, and thinking about what this radical new fermentation does to everything downstream — to labor markets, to what a company even is, to how we’ll organize work and meaning when the old unit of production no longer applies. Those are slower questions. But they’re the ones that feel urgent to me.

The old excuses are getting lighter. Not that everything is possible — but that the weight of the usual constraints has changed.

What you choose to build, and whether you choose to build it at all, is more purely a decision than it used to be. That’s either clarifying or terrifying, depending on the day and my mood.

Categories
History Living Telephones

The Coiled Tether

Do you remember the physical weight of a conversation? It lived in the coiled, plastic spring of a landline telephone cord. We would stretch it across the kitchen, pacing over linoleum floors, the coil twisting around our fingers as we talked into the evening.

That cord was a literal tether. It confined us to a specific radius, but in doing so, it anchored us to the present moment. When you were on the phone, you were nowhere else. You were anchored to the wall, and by extension, to the person on the other end of the line.

There was also the sheer tactile satisfaction of the device itself—the heavy, contoured plastic of the receiver that fit perfectly between shoulder and ear, and the definitive, emphatic slam of hanging up on someone, a punctuation mark that the gentle tap of a touchscreen will never quite replicate.

Then came the subtle, sharp click on the line. Call waiting.

“We traded deep, uninterrupted connection for the anxiety of possibility.”

It was our first taste of modern conversational fragmentation.

Before call waiting, a busy signal was a polite “do not disturb” sign hung on the door of an ongoing dialogue. It meant you were occupied, engaged, entirely spoken for.

The click changed everything. It introduced a sudden, silent geometry to our relationships. When that secondary tone sounded, you were forced into a split-second hierarchy: do I stay with the person I am talking to, or do I chase the mystery of the unknown caller? The phrase, “Can you hold for a second?” became a small, culturally accepted betrayal of the present moment.

We traded deep, uninterrupted connection for the anxiety of possibility.

Eventually, the mystery of the ringing phone was solved altogether by a small, rectangular box with a glowing LCD screen: Caller ID.

For decades, a ringing phone was an invitation to a blind date. You picked up the receiver with a mix of anticipation and vulnerability. It could be a best friend, a wrong number, a telemarketer, or the person you’d been hoping would call all week. You answered with a universal greeting—a neutral, expectant “Hello?”—because you had no idea who was stepping into your home through the wire.

Caller ID gave us the power of the gatekeeper. It allowed us to screen, to prepare, to decide if we had the emotional bandwidth for the name flashing in digital text. We gained control, but we lost serendipity. We lost the unfiltered, genuine surprise of hearing a familiar voice when we least expected it. We stopped opening the door blindly and started looking through the peephole.

Today, we are entirely untethered. There are no coiled cords tying us to the kitchen wall. We carry our communication in our pockets, capable of ignoring texts, sending calls to voicemail, and managing our availability with unprecedented precision. Yet, for all this freedom and control, it often feels as though we are more disconnected than ever.

The good old days weren’t necessarily better because the technology was superior; they were beautiful because the limitations of the technology forced us to be human. The cord forced us to stay put. The lack of caller ID forced us to be open. The absence of call waiting forced us to finish the conversation we started.

Sometimes, looking back, I miss the simple, undeniable commitment of answering a ringing phone, twisting the cord around my index finger, and just listening.

Categories
AI Farming History

The Harvest and the Algorithm: What 1990s Farms Teach Us About AI

There’s a strange kind of wisdom hiding in dusty old books about agriculture.

When you’re caught in the middle of a technological revolution—and with AI, there’s no question that we are—it’s tempting to keep your eyes fixed on the horizon. But sometimes the most clarifying thing you can do is look back.

Tracy Alloway at Bloomberg recently pointed to something genuinely instructive from the past: Richard Critchfield’s 1990 book, Trees, Why Do You Wait? America’s Changing Rural Culture, which traced the collapse of the family farm as industrial agriculture swept through the Midwest.

The broad strokes are familiar. As machinery got more expensive and efficiency became everything, scale won. The 80-acre husband-and-wife operation got swallowed by the 2,000-acre neighbor with access to capital. It wasn’t complicated. It was just gravity.

But here’s the part that should make your ears prick up.

The Seed That Was Supposed to Save Everyone

In the late 1980s, agricultural biotechnology arrived with a very specific promise. The idea was almost elegant: if you could bake the magic directly into the seed, you wouldn’t need all that expensive machinery, all those sprawling acres, all that fertilizer. The playing field would tilt back toward the small farmer.

Critchfield quoted an Office of Technology Assessment report from 1986 that captured the mood of the moment:

“The Office of Technology Assessment in 1986 forecast that biotechnology in crops would be more quickly adopted by richer farmers… Others argue that the more that gets built into the seed itself, the more it means higher yields at lower cost… If it reduced farm income, it could work to the smaller farmer’s advantage. As it is with all new technology, it is hard to foresee the consequences.”

You can feel the cautious optimism in that language. Hard to foresee the consequences. The understatement of a century.

What Actually Happened

The biotech did raise yields. Nobody disputes that. What it didn’t do was leave the gains in the hands of the people doing the actual farming.

Thanks to intellectual property law, patent protections, and a level of corporate consolidation that would have seemed cartoonish if you’d predicted it in advance, the value flowed straight upstream. We didn’t get “more in the seed, less paid for inputs.” We got more in the seed, and vastly more paid for proprietary inputs. The tech giants of agriculture captured the surplus. The farmers got the risk.

Now Listen to How We Talk About AI

We are told AI will democratize expertise. That a one-person startup will be able to code like a ten-person engineering team. That a small business will generate world-class marketing copy. That this is, finally, the great leveler.

Sound familiar?

Alloway’s analysis lands hard precisely because it forces the uncomfortable question: who will actually capture this value? The ownership structure of AI looks eerily similar to the agricultural biotech boom—proprietary models, walled-off training data, and a handful of enormous tech companies positioned to act as tollbooths between everyone else and their own productivity gains.

She’s right to note that “the ultimate distribution of benefits isn’t determined by technology alone. Policy also plays a role.” That sentence is doing a lot of quiet work.

If the agricultural analogy holds, productivity gains from AI won’t naturally flow to the individual worker or the small business owner. Without a robust open-source ecosystem or some deliberate policy intervention, those gains will be captured by whoever controls the compute and the models.

Where the Analogy Might Break Down

Here’s where I think there’s room for genuine optimism—not naive optimism, but structurally grounded optimism.

You cannot open-source arable land. Reverse-engineering a patented biological seed is genuinely hard, legally risky, and practically difficult. Code and model weights are different. They’re infinitely replicable. The marginal cost of distribution is essentially zero.

The battle between closed, proprietary AI and open-source models is still very much live. That’s not nothing. AI is fundamentally more commoditizable than a physical farm, and the history of software suggests that open ecosystems have a real shot when the community is motivated enough to build them.

Who Owns the Harvest?

Technology can reshape daily workflows in months. Power structures take decades to budge, if they budge at all. The mistake would be assuming the former automatically changes the latter.

The question worth sitting with isn’t what can AI do—that list gets longer every week. The question is who decides how the productivity it unlocks gets distributed. That’s not an algorithm problem. It’s a political and economic one.

If we want the AI revolution to be a rising tide rather than another tractor paving over the family farm, we have to look past the technology itself. We have to decide, deliberately, who owns the harvest.

Questions to Ponder

On history and pattern recognition: The agricultural biotech optimists weren’t stupid—they were looking at the technology and making reasonable inferences. What does that tell us about the limits of predicting who benefits from a new technology by studying the technology itself?

On open source as a counterweight: The open-source AI movement (Llama, Mistral, DeepSeek) is often framed as a technical story. Should we be thinking about it primarily as a political economy story—a structural check on proprietary capture?

On the role of policy: Antitrust law, data ownership rights, compute access regulation—which levers, if any, seem realistic? And who has the incentive to pull them?

On the worker vs. the firm: If AI raises individual productivity, does the gain show up in wages, prices, profits, or somewhere else? What would need to be true for workers to actually keep a meaningful share?

On commoditization speed: Software and model weights can be replicated freely—but does speed matter? If proprietary models establish deep lock-in before open alternatives mature, does the theoretical commoditizability even help?

Inspired by Tracy Alloway’s analysis at Bloomberg and Richard Critchfield’s Trees, Why Do You Wait? (1990)

Categories
Authors Books History

The Devil’s Rope

We often mistake simplicity for innocence. When we look at a technological innovation, we tend to judge its weight by its complexity—the microchip, the steam engine, the nuclear reactor. But sometimes, history turns on the axis of something far more rudimentary. Sometimes, the world changes not with a bang, but with a sharp, metallic scratch.

I was recently reading Cattle Kingdom by Christopher Knowlton, and I stopped cold at a passage regarding the invention of barbed wire. It’s an object we pass by on highways or stumble over in overgrown fields without a second thought. Yet, Knowlton writes:

“None was more significant than the creation of barbed wire, which literally reshaped the landscape and set the stage for the era’s eventual destruction—at great personal cost to so many of its key players.”

It is a profound observation. We tend to romanticize the American West as a geography of endless horizons—a place defined by what it didn’t have: fences, borders, limits. It was the Open Range. But that openness was fragile. It existed only as long as the technology to close it was absent.

When Joseph Glidden and others patented their variations of “The Devil’s Rope” in the 1870s, they weren’t just selling steel fencing; they were selling a new concept of ownership. Before wire, a man owned what he could patrol. After wire, a man owned what he could enclose.

The quote strikes a melancholic chord because it highlights a paradox of human progress: the tool created to maximize the land ended up destroying the culture that relied on it. The cowboys, the cattle barons, and the drifters who defined the era were undone by the very efficiency they sought. The wire made the cattle industry profitable on a massive scale, but it also ended the cowboy’s way of life. It stopped the long drives. It turned the cowboy from a navigator of the plains into a gatekeeper.

And, as Knowlton notes, the “personal cost” was staggering. This reshaping of the landscape wasn’t just aesthetic; it was violent. The wire cut off migration routes for bison and the Indigenous tribes who followed them. It sparked the fence-cutting wars, neighbor turning against neighbor in the dark of night, snapping tension wires that represented their livelihood or their imprisonment, depending on which side of the post they stood.

There is a lesson here for us today, far removed from the dusty plains. We are constantly inventing our own versions of barbed wire—digital boundaries, algorithmic silos, tools designed to corral information or efficiency. We build these structures to create order, to claim our stake, and to protect what is ours. But every time we draw a line, we must ask: what era are we destroying? What open range are we closing off forever?

The landscape is always being reshaped. The question is whether we are building fences that protect us, or cages that trap us in.

Categories
News

Turning Out the Lights

[Note: see also The Murder of the Washington Post by Ashley Parker who writes: “Jeff Bezos, the billionaire owner of The Washington Post, and Will Lewis, the publisher he appointed at the end of 2023, are embarking on the latest step of their plan to kill everything that makes the paper special.”]

I was struck this morning by the brutal dismantling of the Washington Post’s international reporting capabilities. The list of bureaus being shuttered by the paper reads like a roll call of the 21st century’s geopolitical fault lines: New Delhi, Sydney, Cairo, the entire Middle East team, China, Iran, Turkey.

It is a stunning retreat.

But to view this merely as a corporate restructuring or a casualty of the dying business model of print journalism seems to miss a deeper, darker signal. This seems like an actual cultural symptom.

“The world is becoming less America-centric by the minute while the United States is becoming more America-centric than ever.”

At the exact moment technology has rendered the world indistinguishable from a single room—where a virus, a meme, or a financial crash in one corner sweeps across the floor to the other in seconds—we are choosing to partition off that room.

There is a tragic symmetry to it. As the center of gravity shifts away from the us, the we respond not by engaging harder, but by closing its eyes.

When a newspaper that has shaped history decides that “reporting on the world” is no longer of valuable enough, it is doing more than saving money – although clearly that’s the primary motivation. It seems to be a surrender to the idea that what happens “over there” doesn’t matter enough to us because the people who were supposed to tell us it was coming are gone.

We seem to be turning out the lights in the rooms we find too difficult, believing that if we cannot see the world, the world cannot touch us. Feels wrong.

The moves closing these bureaus are part of broader cuts at the paper:

  • Closing the Sports section
  • Closing the Books section.
  • Restructuring and shrinking the Metro desk.
  • Suspending the Post Reports podcast.
Categories
AI History Living

The Echo of the Roar

It is a strange sensation to look back exactly one century and see our own reflection staring back at us, sepia-toned but unmistakably familiar. We often think of the “Roaring Twenties” as a stylistic era—flapper dresses, Art Deco skyscrapers, and jazz. But beneath the aesthetic was a seismic technological shift that mirrors our current moment with an almost eerie precision.

In the 1920s, the world was shrinking. The radio was the “Great Disrupter” of the day. For the first time in human history, a voice could travel instantly from a studio in Pittsburgh to a farm in Nebraska. It was the democratization of information, a sudden collapse of distance that left society both thrilled and anxious.

“The radio brought the world into the living room; the algorithm brings the universe into our pockets.”

Today, we stand in the wash of a similar wave. If the radio brought the world into the living room, the internet—and specifically the generative AI of this decade—has brought the collective consciousness of humanity into our pockets.

The parallels in infrastructure are just as striking. One hundred years ago, the internal combustion engine was reshaping the physical landscape. The horse was yielding to the Model T; mud paths were being paved into highways. The very geography of how we lived was being rewritten by the automobile. In the 2020s, the “highway” is digital, built on cloud infrastructure and fiber optics, and the vehicle isn’t a Ford, but an algorithm. We are transitioning from physical labor to cognitive automation just as they transitioned from animal labor to mechanical muscle.

The Texture of Time

There is a specific texture to this kind of time. It is a mix of vertigo and acceleration. In 1925, the cultural critic might have worried that the “machine age” was stripping away our humanity, turning men into cogs on an assembly line. In 2025, we worry that the “algorithmic age” is stripping away our agency, turning creativity into a prompt.

But here is the insight that offers me comfort: The 1920s were chaotic, yes, but they were also a crucible of immense creativity. The pressure of that technological change forged modernism in literature, new forms of architecture, and entirely new ways of understanding the universe (quantum mechanics began finding its footing then).

We are not just passive observers of a repeating cycle. We are the navigators of the rhyme. The technology changes—from vacuum tubes to neural networks—but the human task remains the same: to find the signal in the static. To ensure that as the machines get faster, our souls do not merely get cheaper. We must decide, just as they had to a century ago, whether we will be consumed by the roar, or if we will learn to conduct the music.