Categories
AI Technology

The Bathwater Problem

Gary Kamiya was writing about the Tenderloin when he said it, but the line has been following me around: “The problem is that by saving the baby, you also save the bathwater.”

The pattern is remarkably consistent across every major information technology. Each one arrives promising to liberate the deserving — the faithful, the learned, the civic-minded — and each one immediately, inevitably, arms everyone else too. Gutenberg’s press was understood by its champions as a device for spreading the true Word; within decades it was the primary infrastructure for Protestant schism, Catholic counter-propaganda, astrological almanacs, and pornography. The reformers got their Bible. They also got their pamphlet wars.

The telegraph was greeted as a force for peace — shared information would make war irrational, commerce would bind nations. It also became the nervous system of commodity speculation, financial manipulation, and the first truly industrial-scale news hoaxes. The telephone: connection and the crank call, the crisis line and the threatening voice in the dark. Radio: FDR’s fireside chats and Father Coughlin. Television: Murrow taking down McCarthy, and also fifty years of manufactured consent. The internet: the largest library ever assembled and the largest sewer.

The pattern isn’t coincidental. It’s structural. Each technology expands what’s possible for human expression and coordination — and human expression and coordination contain both the noblest and the worst of us in roughly fixed proportion. The tool doesn’t change the ratio. It scales both sides of it.

What’s interesting historically is how each generation believes their technology will be different — that this time the architecture can be designed to select for the good. The internet era produced the most elaborate version of this belief: algorithmic curation would surface truth, network effects would reward quality, the wisdom of crowds would outcompete misinformation. Instead it turned out that engagement was the attractor, and outrage was the highest-engagement content. The bath got hotter.

The AI moment is the same belief system, restated with more technical sophistication. But the Kamiya line stands. You are saving a baby, and you are saving bathwater, and no one has yet designed a tub that can tell the difference.

The question isn’t whether the bathwater comes with the baby. It always does. The question is whether you turn on the tap.

Categories
AI

The Student, The Teacher, and the Delightful Absurdity of It All

Howard Marks is one of the sharpest financial minds alive. The man has been thinking clearly about markets for fifty years, has written memos that get passed around Wall Street like sacred texts, and has outlasted more market cycles than most of us have had hot dinners. So when Howard Marks decides he needs to get educated about artificial intelligence to write a follow-up to his December memo, he does what any serious intellectual would do: he asks Claude.

And then Claude — the AI — teaches him about Claude.

I’ve been sitting with this for a few days and I’m still not entirely sure whether it’s profound or just very, very funny. Maybe both. Probably both.

Categories
AI

Claude Shannon’s Mirror: Signal, Noise, and Secrets

We spend a great deal of our lives trying to be understood. We shout into the void, send texts across oceans, and build increasingly complex tools to bridge the gaps between our minds.

Yet, equally human is the desire to conceal—to keep our thoughts private, to mask our vulnerabilities, to hide our signals in the static.

It seems paradoxical that communication and secrecy would share the same architecture. But Claude Shannon, the somewhat eccentric yet brilliant father of information theory, saw past the paradox. He recognized that building a bridge and building a fortress require the exact same understanding of physics.

In Fortune’s Formula, William Poundstone captures this dual realization perfectly:

“Shannon later said that thinking about how to conceal messages with random noise motivated some of the insights of information theory. ‘A secrecy system is almost identical with a noisy communications system,’ he claimed. The two lines of inquiry ‘were so close together you couldn’t separate them.'”

When we try to communicate over a noisy channel—a noisy radio or a crowded room—we are fighting entropy. We want our signal to survive the chaos so we can be heard.

When we encrypt a message, however, we are deliberately weaponizing that same chaos. We wrap our signal in artificial noise so dense that only the intended recipient possesses the mathematical filter to extract it.

It is a profound symmetry: clarity and obscurity are merely two ends of the exact same thing.

Today, one of our most advanced AI models is named “Claude” in tribute to Shannon. These neural networks are, at their core, sophisticated engines for separating signal from noise. They ingest the vast, chaotic, and often contradictory static of human knowledge and attempt to synthesize clarity and connection from it. They are mathematical mirrors reflecting Shannon’s earliest theories back at us.

But Shannon’s realization reflects something deeper about the human condition, far beyond the realm of zeroes and ones. We are all walking communications systems, constantly modulating our signals. Every day, we navigate an overwhelming digital landscape filled with deafening static.

Sometimes we desperately want the noise to clear so our true selves can be seen. Other times, we retreat behind a wall of our own generated static—small talk, busyness, deflection, and carefully curated avatars—to protect our inner world from being decoded by those who haven’t earned the key.

Perhaps the real wisdom of information theory isn’t just in knowing how to efficiently transmit a message, but in recognizing the sheer necessity of the noise itself. Without the static, the signal holds no meaning. Without the capacity for secrecy and privacy, the choice to be vulnerable and communicate clearly wouldn’t be nearly as profound.

It seems that we are defined as much by what we choose to encrypt as by what we choose to broadcast. Mirror indeed.

Categories
Probabilities

The Fiction of Certainty

There is a profound discomfort in the space between zero and one.

In her book Spies, Lies, and Algorithms, Amy B. Zegart notes a fundamental flaw in our cognitive architecture:

“Humans are atrocious at understanding probabilities.”

It is a sharp, unsparing observation, but it is not an insult. It is an evolutionary receipt. We are atrocious at probabilities because we were designed for causality, not calculus. On the savanna, if you heard a rustle in the tall grass, you didn’t perform a Bayesian analysis to determine the statistical likelihood of a lion versus the wind. You ran. The cost of a false positive was a wasted sprint; the cost of a false negative was death.

We are the descendants of the paranoid pattern-seekers. We survived because we treated possibilities as certainties.

The Binary Trap

Today, this ancient wiring misfires. We live in a world governed by complex systems, subtle variables, and sliding scales of risk. Yet, our brains still crave the binary. We want “Safe” or “Dangerous.” We want “Guilty” or “Innocent.” We want “It will rain” or “It will be sunny.”

When a meteorologist says there is a 30% chance of rain, and it rains, we scream that they were wrong. We feel betrayed. We forget that 30% is a very real number; it means that in three out of ten parallel universes, you got wet. We just happened to occupy one of the three.

Zegart operates in the world of intelligence—a misty domain of “moderate confidence” and “low likelihood assessments.” In that world, failing to grasp probability leads to catastrophic policy failures. But in our personal lives, it leads to a different kind of failure: the inability to find peace in uncertainty.

Stories > Statistics

We tell ourselves stories to bridge the gap. We prefer a terrifying narrative with a clear cause to a benign reality based on random chance. Stories have arcs; statistics have variance. Stories have heroes and villains; probabilities only have outcomes.

To accept that we are bad at probability is an act of intellectual humility. It forces us to pause when we feel that rush of certainty. It asks us to look at the rustling grass and admit, “I don’t know what that is,” and be okay with sitting in that discomfort.

We may never be good at understanding probabilities—our biology fights against it—but we can get better at forgiving the universe for being random.