Tag: china

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AI Apple Google

The Floor

I compared the frontier to a three-star chef making grilled cheese in “Context Rot” — the smartest models on earth spending most of their time on work beneath them, the way a chef trained at Le Bernardin might still melt cheese between two slices of bread on a Tuesday night and call it dinner. The comfort was the point: if the sharpest tool is saved for hard problems and something merely-very-good handles the rest, nobody’s losing anything. The floor was never the interesting part.

I’ve kept turning the joke over, and I think I had the wrong worry.

Watch what companies do with their AI spend, not what they say. Coinbase moved engineers off frontier models onto open weights and cut its AI spend nearly in half while usage kept climbing. Nvidia runs a closed model as orchestrator and routes the actual volume — the daily uncelebrated bulk of it — to open weights it controls. The frontier is becoming a dispatcher, deciding where the request goes and rarely doing the work itself. The instinct is to worry about whose open weights end up running that volume, and right now the most capable ones at scale are Chinese — GLM, Kimi — which makes it tempting to read this as a contest America is quietly losing: the floor of the AI economy built somewhere else, at a price export controls can’t touch. You cannot embargo a file already downloaded. You cannot price-match free.

But that framing has a hole. Google’s own Gemma family is open-weight and good enough to handle that daily volume without anyone reaching for GLM or Kimi. “Open weights are a Chinese story” only holds if you don’t count the open models the company running Android and half the internet’s search traffic has already shipped.

And once I saw that hole, a bigger one opened behind it. I’ve been trying Apple’s new Siri — arriving with iOS 27 this fall, genuinely surprisingly good in beta — and it made me realize open weights, of any nationality, were never going to cook most of the world’s dinners. Apple and Google are.

Consider what actually determines where the world’s routine inference runs. Not which model benchmarks best, not which weights are downloadable — what’s already installed. Apple ships to well over a billion active devices before routing a single query through Siri’s new architecture. Nobody has to be persuaded to try it, or hear about it on a podcast; it’s the thing that answers when you press the button you’ve pressed for a decade. Google owns the search bar and the Android default the same way. Between them, that’s most of the world’s phones — and phones are where most of the world’s questions get asked.

The open-weight framing assumes the floor is up for grabs, that whoever ships the best free model wins the daily grind by merit. But the floor was never a bazaar. It’s a set of defaults, owned by whoever already has the device in your hand, not whoever holds the most generous license. Apple didn’t need to win the model war to win this. Its heaviest reasoning tier is built with Google, running on Nvidia chips in Google’s cloud, under a deal reported at roughly a billion dollars a year — Apple doesn’t fully own the engine doing the thinking. It doesn’t need to. It owns the button.

That’s a quieter concentration than an export-controls fight, and a harder one to dislodge. An open model can be forked, distilled, undercut, or out-competed by the next release. A billion phones with an assistant built into the lock screen cannot be routed around. Whoever’s weights hum underneath barely matters, the way it barely matters to a diner which supplier delivered the flour. What matters is whose kitchen the meal came from, and whose name is on the door.

The grilled-cheese chef was never the risk. Two chefs are about to own nearly every kitchen on earth, and most of us will never notice — because a kitchen you’ve been eating out of for a decade doesn’t feel like something that was won. It just feels like home.

Owning the kitchen and getting paid for what’s cooked in it, though, turn out to be two different questions. That one’s for another post.

Categories
AI China Youth

The Arithmetic of Youth

The first meeting was at one of the banks on a high floor somewhere in Shanghai, the kind of view that turns a city into an abstraction. It was 2005, and I was there the way American investors were there that year — curious, a little jet-lagged, trying to read a country that was rewriting itself faster than anyone could print the new edition. Across the table sat a management team, and what struck me wasn’t anything they said. It was how young they were. Not junior-young. Running-the-company young.

Afterward — in the hallway or the car, early in the trip, when I still had the confidence of someone who thought he could just ask — I put the question to one of our local colleagues. Casually, expecting a casual answer. Something about a young country, a young economy, energy meeting opportunity.

The answer I got instead was the Cultural Revolution.

There was a generation, she explained, that simply wasn’t there. Sent to the countryside, pulled out of universities, handed shovels instead of textbooks. By the time China opened back up, that cohort had a hole in it — a rung missing from the ladder. So the young people I’d just watched run that meeting weren’t there because anyone had bet on youth. They were there because there was no one older left to put in the chair. Youth, in that boardroom, wasn’t a strategy. It was a vacancy dressed up as one.

I have thought about that answer, off and on, for twenty years, without knowing what to do with it. Then a few weeks ago I read a summary of a conversation with Nathan Lambert — an AI researcher who’d just spent time visiting the frontier labs in Beijing and Hangzhou — and I found myself back in that room, except everything about the youth in it had flipped.

He describes teams at places like Moonshot AI as almost absurdly young, tight-knit, close to giddy about the work — “the best vibes,” he calls it. Zhipu AI, he says, has built something close to an AGI showroom, a physical space engineered to perform confidence for whoever walks through the door. These aren’t companies with a hole where the experienced people should be. These are companies that went looking for twenty-five-year-olds because twenty-five-year-olds move at the speed frontier AI research demands, and installed them at the center of the room. The showroom isn’t hiding a vacancy. It’s staging a choice. That’s panel two.

Same demographic. Same first city — Beijing both times — with a high-speed rail line now running to Hangzhou instead of whatever second city I’d have named twenty years ago. Opposite cause. In 2005, youth in the room meant a generation had been taken from the labor force involuntarily. In 2026, youth in the room means a generation has been selected for it, deliberately, competitively, because being young is now the qualification rather than the disqualifier. The Cultural Revolution left a gap that youth filled by default. The AI boom left a door that youth is filling by design.

I would have stopped there, satisfied with the irony, except for a number I couldn’t get out of my head once I went looking for it: 15.6 percent. That’s China’s urban youth unemployment rate — ages sixteen to twenty-four, university students excluded — as of May 2026, and it counts as good news, down from 16.3 percent in April. A year earlier it had spiked to nearly nineteen percent in a single August, the month twelve million university graduates walked out of commencement and into a labor market that had no idea what to do with them. Some will sit for civil service exams, chasing what people there still call the iron rice bowl — the illusion of permanence a state job used to guarantee, back when your grandparents didn’t choose their careers so much as get assigned them. Others will enroll in another degree, not because they want one, but because a classroom is a more dignified place to wait than an unemployment line.

So there is a third panel now, and it doesn’t fit neatly next to the other two. It isn’t a vacancy, and it isn’t a showroom. It’s just a very large number of young Chinese people who did everything they were told to do — studied hard, got the degree — and are standing outside a door that isn’t opening. And somewhere behind that door, in a much smaller room with much better lighting, another group of young Chinese people, maybe the same graduating class, are building the technology that a Silicon Valley researcher travels overseas to admire for its vibes.

I don’t think those two rooms are as separate as they look. I think the showroom is real, and I think the twelve million are real, and I think the mistake — my mistake, sitting here in Menlo Park two decades removed from that conference table — is letting either one stand in for “Chinese youth” as if it were a single sentence instead of a population. The Moonshot AI team is not a representative sample. It’s the visible sliver of a generation, selected with a precision that turns the unemployment numbers into part of the same mechanism — one sorting process, not two unrelated stories. The best vibes in that lab and the worst numbers in that economy might just be describing the two ends of the same funnel.

I keep coming back to that hallway in 2005, and to how confident I was in the question I asked — as if a generation’s youth could only ever be telling one story. It couldn’t then, and it can’t now. I got a true answer that day and thought I understood something. I understood one panel of a triptych I hadn’t seen the rest of yet — and I’m still not sure I’ve seen all of it.

Categories
AI AI: Large Language Models China

Cranes on the Horizon

In 2005, during my first trip to Shanghai and Beijing, the most striking feature of the skyline wasn’t the architecture—it was the cranes. More than I could possibly count, perched atop half-finished skyscrapers like a mechanical forest. Entire districts seemed to be mid-construction simultaneously, as if someone had pressed a button and the whole country decided to build everything at once. Dan Wang in his book “Breakneck” described China as the “engineering state” that approaches national problems with physical solutions. Back in 2005, coming from Silicon Valley, I thought I understood what growth looked like. I didn’t.

I’ve been thinking about that trip while reading Nathan Lambert’s recent piece, “Notes from Inside China’s AI Labs.” Lambert — who runs the Interconnects newsletter and does serious work tracking the open-weight LLM ecosystem — just returned from visiting essentially every major AI lab in China. Moonshot, Zhipu, Meituan, Xiaomi, Qwen, Ant Ling, 01.ai. He went in with genuine curiosity and came back with humility. That combination is rarer than it should be.

What he found was the cranes. Different domain, same energy.

Lambert’s central observation is about culture, not capability. The Chinese labs aren’t winning on any single technical breakthrough — they’re winning on execution discipline. He describes researchers, many of them active students, who bring no ego to the work. They absorb context fast, drop assumptions faster, and seem genuinely unbothered by the philosophical debates that seem to swirl constantly in the American AI community. When he tried to engage Chinese researchers on the long-term social risks of models or the ethics of AI behavior, those questions “hung in the air with a simple confusion. It’s a category error to them.” Their role is to build the best model. Full stop. To them, an LLM isn’t a philosophical entity to be interrogated; it’s a piece of infrastructure to be optimized.

That description landed for me. Not as a criticism of American research culture, but as a real observation about what the moment demands. Building good LLMs today is, as Lambert puts it, meticulous work across the entire stack — “all points of the model can give some improvements, and fitting them in together is a complex process.”

The work that matters most right now isn’t the 0-to-1 creative leap; it’s the thousand unglamorous decisions executed without complaint. Students who haven’t yet learned to lobby for their own ideas turn out to be well-suited for exactly this.

Lambert ends on a note that’s hard to shake. Looking up from his laptop on a high-speed train, he keeps seeing cranes on the horizon. He draws the same connection I did, though from the inside: the construction everywhere fits the broader culture and energy around building. “When I look up from my laptop and always see bunches of cranes on the horizon, it obviously fits in with the broader culture and energy around building in China.”

Twenty years after my first visit, the cranes are still there. They’ve just moved indoors — into server rooms and training runs and model releases that land every few months with quiet confidence. In 2005, what China was building was obvious: you could see the steel frames going up. What’s being built now is harder to see, which may be exactly why it keeps surprising us.

Check out Lambert’s essay – it’s remarkable. If the 20th century was defined by who could move the most earth, the 21st will be defined by who can move the most tokens. And right now, the cranes are moving faster than we think.

Categories
Business China

Innovations from the Automotive Sector

I’ve been listening to the latest podcast from Dwarfish Patel in which he’s interviewing Arthur Kroeber (“China’s Manufacturing Dominance: State Directives & Ruthless Competition“).

One of the topics discussed is how “China recognized that pretty much every other country that had gotten rich had done so in large part by building up an automotive industry that then served as the mechanism for creating innovations in other sectors. … They said, “We have to have a big auto industry. This is one of the key industries that we have to support.””

Kroeber goes on to describe how China opened up to enabling 50/50 joint ventures between Chinese auto companies and foreign auto manufacturers.

While that worked initially, eventually it became clear that to really enable globally competitive auto manufacturing in China there had to be another solution.

That solution was allowing Tesla to come into China in 2018 and build a Gigafactory in Shanghai. In so doing, China allowed a globally competitive auto manfacturer (Tesla) to effectively compete with local Chinese companies and, in so doing, create the need for those local Chinese companies to compete much more effectively with a global player like Tesla.

It’s a fascinating story. One of the other discussions in the early part of the interview involves how the U.S. might consider doing that in reverse – allowing Chinese companies to come into the U.S. market and through competition educate American companies so that they improve their globally competitive position. Politically impossible in the current climate – but an obvious idea based upon the Chinese experience.