Tag: AI economics

Categories
AI

The Quiet Trade-offs of Open Weights

An open letter is circulating this week — Open Weights and American AI Leadership — signed by a broad coalition of companies arguing that downloadable model weights are essential to U.S. competitiveness, diffusion of capability, and even safety. It makes a strong case on access, competition, and sovereignty. It also nods, briefly, to the fact that once weights are released they pass beyond the original developer’s control.

What it doesn’t fully reckon with are two structural realities that follow from that release. Neither is an argument against open weights. Both are simply facts about what openness costs, and what it buys.

Two core limitations

First, control.
Once the weights leave the developer’s servers, the developer can no longer dictate how the model is used. System prompts, refusal training, monitoring, rate limits, rapid safety updates — none of it reaches an independent deployment. Users can strip safeguards, fine-tune for purposes the original team would never sanction, or run the model somewhere it was never meant to go. The letter acknowledges the loss of control. It doesn’t linger on what that means for ongoing safety governance.

Second, learning.
Closed, hosted models draw on a continuous stream of real usage — the queries people actually ask, the reasoning traces that result, the places the model fails or succeeds in the wild. As appropriate that exhaust can be sampled, reviewed, and fed back into improvement. Open weights running independently offer no such path. The developer has no visibility into how the model is being used at scale once it’s out the door. Improvement then falls to slower, thinner channels: community datasets, published evals, distillation from any parallel closed models the lab still runs, internal preference data. The high-volume, real-distribution signal is gone.

These two limitations travel together. The same openness that strips the developer’s control also strips its ability to learn from the model’s actual use.

Sovereignty flips the perspective

A parallel argument has been building around “sovereignty” — an enterprise or government’s ability to own its data, its fine-tuned weights, its compute, its proprietary edge. In this framing, open weights are a path to control, but for the user, not the developer. The organization downloads the model, adapts it inside its own environment — often air-gapped — and keeps whatever capability results private. What the lab surrenders in ongoing control, the institution gains in independence.

But the same move that delivers sovereignty deepens the learning problem. An organization running the model under genuine sovereignty keeps its queries, reasoning traces, and institutional knowledge inside its own walls, by design. None of that returns to the developer. The more high-value users — governments, defense, critical infrastructure, large enterprises — choose sovereign deployments, the thinner the real-world signal available to the labs training the next generation of models. Local fine-tuning can still happen, but that learning stays private. It doesn’t flow back into the shared base model.

What the letter leaves out

The letter is right that closed models aren’t automatically safer, that concentration creates single points of failure, and that transparency invites broader scrutiny. It’s also right that open weights expand access and cut lock-in. Those points hold.

But it treats the developer’s loss of control mainly as a manageable risk that community examination can offset. It celebrates user control and sovereignty without mapping the full exchange: the developer loses both control and its richest usage signal, and that signal thins further as more institutions choose real sovereignty. The information environment models improve in is changed by these choices — not just the distribution of access.

Other distinctions worth naming

  • Update velocity. Closed models patch globally and immediately. Open-weight deployments lag; many users never leave an old version.
  • Customization power. The flip side of lost control is real specialization — downstream users can adapt a model far deeper into a narrow domain than its original developer ever will.
  • Transparency versus opacity. Open weights let outside researchers inspect and red-team a model in ways closed systems don’t allow.
  • Economic structure. Open weights commoditize the base model and push value toward data, fine-tuning, infrastructure, and applications.
  • Privacy at the edge. Running a model fully offline or on private infrastructure is a guarantee hosted services simply can’t match.

A clearer accounting

Open weights aren’t a free lunch. They’re a deliberate trade: the developer gives up ongoing control and the continuous signal of real usage, in exchange for diffusion, customization, outside scrutiny, and user independence. Institutional sovereignty amplifies one side of that trade — it solves the dependency problem for the user while further starving the developer of high-stakes, real-world feedback.

That trade may still be the right one for research progress, economic diffusion, spreading capability beyond a handful of labs, privacy-preserving deployment. But it’s a trade with real, compounding costs. Treating the loss of control as a footnote, and the loss of the learning signal as invisible, leaves an incomplete map.

The letter is right that American leadership will be judged by the strength of the whole ecosystem, not by any single frontier model. An accurate map of that ecosystem has to include what openness and sovereignty actually cost the original developers, in control and in learning both. Only then can we reason clearly about when those costs are worth paying — and what might offset them.

The conversation is better when we name the full set of trade-offs instead of talking around them.

Categories
Computers IBM

The Day the Last Mainframe Went Dark

Note: I literally grew up during the heyday of the IBM mainframe era. My first real job was working for IBM in San Francisco beginning in 1968. I’m a “big iron” kind of guy. But this post was imagined after reading the following in a July 14, 2026 announcement from IBM: When we discussed our expectations with you in April, we noted that we would be wrapping on the launch of z17 in the second quarter. Given this was the strongest start to a mainframe program in our history, we expected Infrastructure revenue to decline low-single digits for the year, beginning this quarter. What played out was worse than our expectations, driven by a shortfall in our Z performance and the associated software stack, primarily in Transaction Processing. In the last few weeks of June, we saw clients shift their quarterly capex spend toward servers, storage, and memory purchases to secure supply-constrained infrastructure ahead of expected price increases. This dynamic impacted client buying patterns. While we anticipated some supply chain related impact in our expectations, we did not anticipate the magnitude of the capex reprioritization.

It won’t arrive with fanfare. No countdown, no viral video of engineers raising a glass. One morning—sometime in the 2040s, perhaps later—a small team in a climate-controlled data center will complete the final cutover. They’ll flip the switches, watch the lights dim, and listen as the hum of the last production IBM mainframe fades to silence. An era that began with the System/360 in 1964 will end. Not with a crash. With the soft click of obsolescence.

We’ve been predicting the mainframe’s death for decades. In the early 1990s, pundits declared it doomed. They were wrong. Those systems—reliable, secure, capable of staggering transaction volumes with near-perfect uptime—became the invisible backbone of modern life. Your last bank transfer, airline reservation, insurance claim, or government benefit likely touched one. They endured because they solved hard problems well: high-volume, mission-critical processing where failure was never an option.

The path to that final power-down was never a rupture. It was a long, uneven evolution—driven by economics, technology, talent shifts, and the patient work of modernization. AI tools accelerated the transition. They didn’t cause it.

Lessons from Earlier Transitions

Steam engines dominated railroads for generations—powerful, reliable, deeply integrated into the industrial economy. Diesel won through incremental advantages: better efficiency, lower maintenance, longer trains with less labor. Railroads rebuilt infrastructure and retired the old iron as the economics aligned, route by route.

Prop planes opened the skies to mass travel. Jets brought speed and range that transformed global connectivity—but airlines didn’t scrap fleets overnight. They ran hybrids during the overlap, invested in new airports and training, and retired props as jet economics and passenger demand made the case irresistible.

The mainframe followed this pattern. AI coding agents—Claude Code, Cursor, OpenAI models, AWS Transform, IBM watsonx—transformed the brutal manual work of understanding undocumented COBOL, extracting buried business logic, generating tests, refactoring safely. What once demanded scarce veteran experts for months or years could now be accelerated, with rigorous human oversight and equivalence testing.

Platforms like Visa’s Pismo showed a smarter path: incremental modernization. Cloud-native microservices layered alongside legacy cores, rather than rip-and-replace. Banks demonstrated real progress. Hybrid strategies won—AI inference running close to sensitive data on evolved mainframes (IBM’s z17 and successors, with on-chip accelerators), while new applications and analytics moved to elastic cloud environments.

IBM positioned the platform as an “AI factory” for low-latency, secure workloads. But pricing pressure was constant. High, capacity-based software licensing made the economics harder to defend as cloud offered predictable, usage-driven costs and younger talent gravitated toward modern stacks. For CFOs weighing rising maintenance against retiring COBOL expertise and AI-assisted migration, the scales tipped.

By the mid-2030s, competitive and regulatory forces intensified. Fujitsu’s exit from mainframes created a cliff in affected markets. Skills shortages accelerated. Even the most conservative holdouts—ultra-high-volume, regulated systems in finance, government, specialized industries—began serious moves, as simulation environments and exhaustive parallel testing brought the risk down to manageable size.

The Final Act

The last systems to go were the stubborn ones, where disruption carried outsized consequences. When the final cutover succeeded—after months of flawless parallel running—the team powered down the machine. A global bank, a payments processor, a government entity. Maybe a small ceremony: engineers who’d kept it alive for decades, trading stories of the iron that never failed when the world needed it most.

Picture the aircraft boneyards outside Tucson or Victorville, retired 747s sitting in rows under the sun, giving up parts to new generations before they’re recycled. Mainframes will meet a similar fate, more climate-controlled. Some linger in warehouses as insurance, still humming faintly in test or archival roles. Others get dismantled by IT asset disposition teams—data wiped to standard, processors and I/O cards harvested for niche markets. The bulk gets recycled, metal and circuitry returning to the supply chain. Like the jets, the iron won’t vanish in disgrace. Its lessons in reliability and disciplined engineering at scale live on, embedded in whatever comes next.

The world didn’t stop. Transactions kept flowing, now on distributed, elastic, AI-augmented platforms that had absorbed the best of what came before. The mainframe era didn’t end in failure. It ended because better options finally existed for every workload.

What Endures

We’ll look back with respect and nostalgia. The mainframe wasn’t flashy, but it taught something durable: some problems reward obsessive focus on reliability and scale; disciplined engineering outlasts hype cycles; the wisest transitions are rarely clean breaks. They’re patient evolutions that carry forward what matters.

IBM will have completed its own transformation by then—software, services, hybrid orchestration, AI tools that work across environments. The company that built the platform helps close the book on it.

The last mainframe going dark won’t feel like loss. It will feel like the natural close of a chapter that powered the digital economy through its most formative decades. The iron did its job. Now the next architecture takes the stage, standing on shoulders built to last.

Categories
AI Business

The Reverse Information Paradox We’ve Always Had

Satya Nadella wrote recently about what he calls the Reverse Information Paradox: enterprises pay for AI intelligence twice. Once in money. Again in the proprietary knowledge they surrender through every prompt, correction, and evaluation. The better they use the model, the more of their own institutional understanding leaks into someone else’s system. The vendor ends up knowing more about the buyer’s business than the buyer knows about what the vendor retained.

Replace “model” with “employee” (or “consultant”) and the paradox is not new at all.

You pay for a person once with salary. You pay again with something harder to price: the context, relationships, and judgment they must absorb to become useful to you. The better they perform, the deeper the immersion, the more of your particular way of doing things moves into their head. Every correction and late-night conversation is another trace of institutional memory changing hands. When they leave, some of that memory leaves with them. Not always through theft. Usually just through the ordinary residue of good work.

The visible cost is salary; the invisible cost is the slow transfer of what makes you distinctive. High performers get more access precisely because they’re high performers, which means the leakage accelerates exactly when you can least afford it. The exhaust is just harder to see with people than with tokens — it moves through conversation and mental models instead of logs.

The analogy has a limit, and the limit matters. Employees bring knowledge in, not just absorb it. They have judgment and relationships a model doesn’t. Models are purely absorptive, and once something is inside them, it’s infinitely reproducible — a person can only be in one place, working for one employer, at a time. We’ve had a few hundred years to build tools for the human version of this problem: contracts, culture, non-competes. The model equivalent is still being invented in real time, which is exactly why Nadella felt the need to name it.

Apple’s recent legal action against former employees who joined OpenAI is this pattern in its sharpest form. Whatever the specifics, the shape is familiar: people who spent years inside one of the most sophisticated organizations in the world, carrying out knowledge that never appeared on any balance sheet and was hard to contain. No one fully anticipates what a mind absorbs simply by being in the room long enough.

That’s the real difference between the silicon case and the human one. You can try to take action to wall off knowledge flowing to a model. You cannot wall off what someone has learned to notice.

Categories
AI

The Encyclopedia and the Reasoner

I was standing in the cereal aisle a few weeks ago, doing the thing I always do — flipping the box over, scanning the fine print, comparing fiber grams like it mattered more than it probably does — when I thought about the model I’d been testing that morning. Sharp. Fast. Occasionally, confidently, wrong about something I could have looked up in ten seconds.

There was no label for that. No panel telling me what was inside, what it was good at, what it might get wrong, what it cost to run. Just a chat window and a kind of blind trust.

That’s the itch behind this post. What would it look like if AI models came with something like a Nutrition Facts label — the kind the FDA forced onto every box in your pantry back in 1994? Not as a gimmick, but as a real answer to a real problem: we are feeding these things into our decisions, our writing, our portfolios, our kids’ homework, largely on faith.

The IQ Number That Isn’t Quite an IQ Number

I keep running into a shorthand in investing circles — Jordi Visser and others talking about frontier models as “140 IQ” systems, reasoning at a level that outpaces most humans on the kinds of puzzles we associate with fluid intelligence. Pattern recognition. Logic chains. Novel deduction under pressure.

It’s a useful number. It’s also a bit of a trick.

Human IQ tests were built to measure something narrow and specific — not wisdom, not knowledge, not judgment, but the raw machinery of reasoning. When we borrow that language for AI, we inherit the same narrowness, which is fine as long as we remember it. A model that aces abstract reasoning benchmarks isn’t necessarily the model that knows the correct dosage, the right case law, or what actually happened in 1932. Reasoning and knowledge are cousins, not twins.

Two Kinds of Smart

Here’s an old-fashioned way to think about the split: Britannica versus World Book.

Britannica was the encyclopedia my father would have trusted — dense, expert-written, unapologetically deep, assuming you could keep up. World Book was the one actually sitting on the shelf in most houses I knew growing up, mine included: friendlier, broader, built for a general reader, a little shallower in exchange for being a little more useful on a Tuesday night with a homework assignment due.

Neither is wrong. They’re optimized for different things. And training data does the same kind of sorting. A model fed heavily on curated, scholarly, expert-vetted sources leans Britannica — deep, careful, occasionally slow to update. A model trained on the sprawl of the open web leans World Book — broad, current, occasionally sloppy, sometimes brilliant at the edges precisely because it’s seen everything.

Any honest label for a model needs a section on this. Call it “Knowledge Sourcing.” Not just how big the training set was, but what kind of encyclopedia it’s pretending to be.

Sketching the Label

If I could design the box myself, it might read something like this:

Serving Size: 1 query, ~500 tokens

Reasoning Score: 138 (fluid problem-solving, logic, abstraction) Knowledge Depth: Moderate–High (cutoff: [date]; strongest in [domains]; weakest in [domains])
Ingredients: Curated scholarly corpora, licensed news archives, public web crawl, synthetic reasoning data, human feedback Allergens: Confident hallucination under ambiguous prompts; recency gaps beyond training cutoff; known weakness in [specific domain]
Cost per Serving: $X per million tokens; Y watt-hours per query Best Paired With: Retrieval tools, human review for high-stakes decisions

It’s a little tongue-in-cheek written out like that. But underneath the joke is something I actually want — the same instinct that made me read cereal boxes as a kid. Not to be scared of what’s inside, just to know.

The Part That Actually Excites Me

Here’s where the scaling laws get interesting, and where I think the real opportunity sits.

World knowledge is expensive. It’s greedy for data and parameters — you need to have practically read the internet to know the boiling point of tungsten, the plot of a minor Victorian novel, and the org chart of a mid-cap company all at once. Reasoning, it turns out, is a different kind of animal. It can be distilled, compressed, taught through synthetic problems and careful post-training, and squeezed into something far smaller than you’d expect.

Which means a genuinely thrilling possibility is already taking shape: sharp, high-reasoning models small enough to run on a phone or a laptop, entirely offline, because they’ve shed the encyclopedia and kept the mind. Pair one of those with a personal index — your own notes, your own documents, a retrieval layer built around your actual life — and you get something closer to a personal thinking partner than a general-purpose oracle. Private. Fast. Always available. Tuned to you rather than to everyone. Apple may be on to something with this kind of strategy?

I think about this constantly in my own workflow — the daily scans, the little agents I’ve built to help sort signal from noise, the genealogy digging, the investment frameworks I keep refining. What I usually want isn’t more encyclopedia. It’s a clear-headed reasoner sitting next to my own carefully kept knowledge, not buried under someone else’s version of the whole internet.

Why the Label Matters More Than the Score

None of this works, though, without honesty about what’s inside the box. A 140 on a reasoning benchmark tells you almost nothing about whether a model will quietly misremember a fact it was never that confident about in the first place. And a model can be extraordinarily knowledgeable while being a mediocre reasoner — plenty capable of reciting the right ingredients and still getting the recipe wrong.

The nutrition label movement in food didn’t eliminate junk food. It just made it possible to choose junk food on purpose, with your eyes open, instead of by accident. I’d like the same deal with AI. Not a demand that every model be a genius generalist, but a demand that I get to know what I’m actually consuming — and choose the lean local thinker over the bloated encyclopedia when that’s what the moment calls for, or the other way around when it isn’t.

Curiosity got me into that cereal aisle habit decades ago, and it’s the same instinct pulling me toward this idea now — not suspicion of the box, just a wish to read it clearly before I decide how much of it to trust.

What would you want on your label?

Categories
AI AI: Large Language Models Apple

The Slipstream Strategy

Apple had a problem no amount of money could solve. An iPhone can’t draw the power or shed the heat of a data center, so ten different tasks can’t mean ten different models fighting for the same sliver of RAM. Apple’s answer was to freeze one small, efficient base model into the device and then swap tiny adapters in and out of it in milliseconds — a summarization adapter for your texts, a Siri adapter for on-screen actions, and a handoff to Private Cloud Compute for anything heavier. The phone behaves like it’s running many models. It’s running one model wearing many hats.

That architecture — a frozen base plus swappable adapters — is quietly becoming the default way serious AI companies build, and it’s worth understanding why, because it inverts the assumption most people still carry into this industry.

The assumption is that winning means owning a frontier model. Sierra co-founder Clay Bavor pushed back on that on a recent 20VC episode: pouring capital into your own pre-training, he argued, tends to leave you holding a highly perishable bag of floating-point numbers. Open-weight models improve fast enough that yesterday’s frontier is next quarter’s commodity. The companies playing this well aren’t racing to out-spend the labs. They’re slipstreaming behind them — taking the free, state-of-the-art engine and putting all their effort into what sits on top of it.

What sits on top is LoRA — low-rank adaptation. The old failure mode was catastrophic forgetting: fine-tune a model hard enough on your own data and it forgets how to reason generally. LoRA sidesteps this by leaving the base model untouched and training a small set of additional parameters alongside it — a thin layer of expertise bolted onto a frozen foundation. You get real domain depth without touching the thing that makes the model work at all.

The business logic that follows from this is the actual point, and it’s simpler than it looks:

You stop being hostage to any one model provider — if a better open-weight model ships next month, you port your adapter, not your whole product. You can serve hundreds of differently-customized clients off one base model on one piece of hardware, instead of running a separate giant model per customer. You can ship a fix in an afternoon, because an adapter is a few hundred megabytes, not a training run. And in regulated industries, your proprietary data can train an adapter that never leaves your own infrastructure.

None of this is really a story about model architecture. It’s a story about where the moat moved. For a while the moat was raw capability — whoever had the best model won. Apple and Sierra are betting the moat is now somewhere else entirely: in how tightly you can weave a commodity intelligence into a specific workflow, a specific dataset, a specific customer relationship. The engine is free. The adapter is the business.

Categories
AI Apple Google

The Floor

I compared the frontier to a three-star chef making grilled cheese in “Context Rot” — the smartest models on earth spending most of their time on work beneath them, the way a chef trained at Le Bernardin might still melt cheese between two slices of bread on a Tuesday night and call it dinner. The comfort was the point: if the sharpest tool is saved for hard problems and something merely-very-good handles the rest, nobody’s losing anything. The floor was never the interesting part.

I’ve kept turning the joke over, and I think I had the wrong worry.

Watch what companies do with their AI spend, not what they say. Coinbase moved engineers off frontier models onto open weights and cut its AI spend nearly in half while usage kept climbing. Nvidia runs a closed model as orchestrator and routes the actual volume — the daily uncelebrated bulk of it — to open weights it controls. The frontier is becoming a dispatcher, deciding where the request goes and rarely doing the work itself. The instinct is to worry about whose open weights end up running that volume, and right now the most capable ones at scale are Chinese — GLM, Kimi — which makes it tempting to read this as a contest America is quietly losing: the floor of the AI economy built somewhere else, at a price export controls can’t touch. You cannot embargo a file already downloaded. You cannot price-match free.

But that framing has a hole. Google’s own Gemma family is open-weight and good enough to handle that daily volume without anyone reaching for GLM or Kimi. “Open weights are a Chinese story” only holds if you don’t count the open models the company running Android and half the internet’s search traffic has already shipped.

And once I saw that hole, a bigger one opened behind it. I’ve been trying Apple’s new Siri — arriving with iOS 27 this fall, genuinely surprisingly good in beta — and it made me realize open weights, of any nationality, were never going to cook most of the world’s dinners. Apple and Google are.

Consider what actually determines where the world’s routine inference runs. Not which model benchmarks best, not which weights are downloadable — what’s already installed. Apple ships to well over a billion active devices before routing a single query through Siri’s new architecture. Nobody has to be persuaded to try it, or hear about it on a podcast; it’s the thing that answers when you press the button you’ve pressed for a decade. Google owns the search bar and the Android default the same way. Between them, that’s most of the world’s phones — and phones are where most of the world’s questions get asked.

The open-weight framing assumes the floor is up for grabs, that whoever ships the best free model wins the daily grind by merit. But the floor was never a bazaar. It’s a set of defaults, owned by whoever already has the device in your hand, not whoever holds the most generous license. Apple didn’t need to win the model war to win this. Its heaviest reasoning tier is built with Google, running on Nvidia chips in Google’s cloud, under a deal reported at roughly a billion dollars a year — Apple doesn’t fully own the engine doing the thinking. It doesn’t need to. It owns the button.

That’s a quieter concentration than an export-controls fight, and a harder one to dislodge. An open model can be forked, distilled, undercut, or out-competed by the next release. A billion phones with an assistant built into the lock screen cannot be routed around. Whoever’s weights hum underneath barely matters, the way it barely matters to a diner which supplier delivered the flour. What matters is whose kitchen the meal came from, and whose name is on the door.

The grilled-cheese chef was never the risk. Two chefs are about to own nearly every kitchen on earth, and most of us will never notice — because a kitchen you’ve been eating out of for a decade doesn’t feel like something that was won. It just feels like home.

Owning the kitchen and getting paid for what’s cooked in it, though, turn out to be two different questions. That one’s for another post.

Categories
AI Work

The Dealers of Intelligence

There’s a scene early in John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent Society where he describes Americans of an earlier era regarding industrial output with something close to reverence — the sheer productive capacity of the nation seemed almost miraculous, a force that could reshape civilization. Within a generation, of course, that same output had become background noise. Factories hummed, goods appeared, and nobody paused to marvel.

The miraculous had become mundane, and the mundane had become infrastructure.

I found myself thinking about that arc recently while listening to Sam Lessin on the More or Less podcast.

Lessin made an observation that I haven’t been able to shake: we probably aren’t heading toward a single, triumphant AGI monopoly — some god-machine that one fortunate company builds first and then rents to the rest of us in perpetuity.

Instead, Lessin suggested, we are barreling toward something far more ordinary, and in its ordinariness, far more interesting.

“There will be lots of ‘dealers of intelligence’. No one company will corner the market, no one big winner of AGI.”

Dealers of intelligence. I keep turning that phrase over. Where do we end up? No rapture, no singularity, no chosen company ascending to the throne of cognition. Just suppliers, distribution channels, price competition — the unglamorous mechanics of any maturing market.

And historically, that’s exactly how this tends to go.

Salt was once precious enough to pay soldiers with. Spices rewrote the map of the world. Steel, oil, and computing power each arrived wrapped in mystique and guarded behind scarcity before the inevitable happened: extraction improved, distribution scaled, and the miracle became a utility. Nobody thinks about the engineering marvel of the electrical grid when they flip a light switch. They just expect the light to come on.

If Lessin is right — and the competitive landscape of the last two years does little to argue against him — intelligence will follow the same curve. Not a single oracle, but a market. Cognitive utilities. Price-per-token negotiations. The same forces that commoditized bandwidth will commoditize reasoning, and we’ll argue about our AI subscription tiers the way we currently argue about our data plans.

Which forces the interesting question: when genius is cheap, what exactly becomes valuable?

The professional moats of the last century were largely built on the ability to process specialized information and output reliable answers.

The doctor, the lawyer, the financial analyst, the programmer — each occupied a protected position because access to their domain of reasoning was genuinely scarce.

If I can buy a substantial fraction of that reasoning from a commodity supplier for fractions of a cent, the premium on raw cognitive horsepower doesn’t just shrink. It collapses.

What’s left, I think, is the un-commoditizable. Empathy. Physical presence. Judgment under conditions of genuine uncertainty and consequence. And above all — taste.

Taste is the thing that has always resisted systematization, because taste isn’t rational in any clean sense. It’s the residue of lived experience, of specific childhoods and particular failures and the accumulated weight of caring about things over time.

An algorithm can produce a structurally flawless piece of music; it takes a human to decide whether it matters, and why, and to whom.

That act of curation — of choosing what deserves to exist and what doesn’t — is going to become more consequential, not less, as the supply of technically competent output explodes.

There’s something almost liberating about this, if you let yourself sit with it.

A world of commoditized intelligence is, paradoxically, a profoundly human one. It removes the burden of raw computation from the center of what we do and pushes us toward the edges — toward the questions only we can ask, the connections only we can feel, the decisions only we can be held accountable for.

The dealers of intelligence will handle the materials. We’ll still have to decide what to build. Architects.

Questions to Consider

  1. If intelligence becomes a commodity like electricity or bandwidth, which industries or professions will be slowest to feel that pressure — and why?
  2. Lessin frames this as a market with many suppliers rather than a winner-take-all race. Does the competitive landscape today support that view, or does it still look like a sprint toward consolidation?
  3. What does “taste” actually mean when the person exercising it is doing so with AI-augmented perception and judgment? Is it still the same thing?
  4. Who gets to haggle with the dealers? If cognitive utilities are cheap in aggregate but not universally accessible, does commoditization risk deepening inequality rather than democratizing thought?
  5. If the value of answering questions falls and the value of asking them rises, what does education need to look like — and how far is it from what it looks like now?