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AI AI: Large Language Models China

Cranes on the Horizon

In 2005, during my first trip to Shanghai and Beijing, the most striking feature of the skyline wasn’t the architecture—it was the cranes. More than I could possibly count, perched atop half-finished skyscrapers like a mechanical forest. Entire districts seemed to be mid-construction simultaneously, as if someone had pressed a button and the whole country decided to build everything at once. Dan Wang in his book “Breakneck” described China as the “engineering state” that approaches national problems with physical solutions. Back in 2005, coming from Silicon Valley, I thought I understood what growth looked like. I didn’t.

I’ve been thinking about that trip while reading Nathan Lambert’s recent piece, “Notes from Inside China’s AI Labs.” Lambert — who runs the Interconnects newsletter and does serious work tracking the open-weight LLM ecosystem — just returned from visiting essentially every major AI lab in China. Moonshot, Zhipu, Meituan, Xiaomi, Qwen, Ant Ling, 01.ai. He went in with genuine curiosity and came back with humility. That combination is rarer than it should be.

What he found was the cranes. Different domain, same energy.

Lambert’s central observation is about culture, not capability. The Chinese labs aren’t winning on any single technical breakthrough — they’re winning on execution discipline. He describes researchers, many of them active students, who bring no ego to the work. They absorb context fast, drop assumptions faster, and seem genuinely unbothered by the philosophical debates that seem to swirl constantly in the American AI community. When he tried to engage Chinese researchers on the long-term social risks of models or the ethics of AI behavior, those questions “hung in the air with a simple confusion. It’s a category error to them.” Their role is to build the best model. Full stop. To them, an LLM isn’t a philosophical entity to be interrogated; it’s a piece of infrastructure to be optimized.

That description landed for me. Not as a criticism of American research culture, but as a real observation about what the moment demands. Building good LLMs today is, as Lambert puts it, meticulous work across the entire stack — “all points of the model can give some improvements, and fitting them in together is a complex process.”

The work that matters most right now isn’t the 0-to-1 creative leap; it’s the thousand unglamorous decisions executed without complaint. Students who haven’t yet learned to lobby for their own ideas turn out to be well-suited for exactly this.

Lambert ends on a note that’s hard to shake. Looking up from his laptop on a high-speed train, he keeps seeing cranes on the horizon. He draws the same connection I did, though from the inside: the construction everywhere fits the broader culture and energy around building. “When I look up from my laptop and always see bunches of cranes on the horizon, it obviously fits in with the broader culture and energy around building in China.”

Twenty years after my first visit, the cranes are still there. They’ve just moved indoors — into server rooms and training runs and model releases that land every few months with quiet confidence. In 2005, what China was building was obvious: you could see the steel frames going up. What’s being built now is harder to see, which may be exactly why it keeps surprising us.

Check out Lambert’s essay – it’s remarkable. If the 20th century was defined by who could move the most earth, the 21st will be defined by who can move the most tokens. And right now, the cranes are moving faster than we think.

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AI Living Productivity

The Reality Gap

“I follow AI adoption pretty closely, and I have never seen such a yawning inside/outside gap. People in SF are putting multi-agent claudeswarms in charge of their lives… people elsewhere are still trying to get approval to use Copilot in Teams.” — Kevin Roose

There is a specific kind of vertigo that comes from scrolling through the “Inside” of the AI bubble while the rest of the world simply goes to work. It is the dizziness of watching a new species of behavior emerge—”wireheading” and “claudeswarms”—while the vast majority of the economy is still asking for permission to use a spellchecker.

The future isn’t just unevenly distributed; it is becoming mutually unintelligible.

Roose notes a “yawning inside/outside gap” that feels distinct from previous tech cycles. In one reality—geographically centered in San Francisco and digitally centered in specific discords—people are operating with a level of agency only sci-fi writers dared to imagine. They are deploying multi-agent swarms to manage their lives and consulting large language models for existential guidance.

In the other reality—the one inhabited by the vast majority of the global workforce—people are still waiting for an IT ticket to clear so they can use a basic productivity assistant.

It is tempting to look at this divide solely through the lens of technical access, but Roose hits on a deeper truth: “there seems to be a cultural takeoff happening in addition to the technical one.”

This is the friction of our current moment. It is not just that the tools are different; the permissions we give ourselves to use them are different. The “Inside” is operating with a mindset of radical experimentation and integration. The “Outside” is operating within legacy frameworks of risk mitigation and bureaucratic approval.

The danger of this gap isn’t just economic inequality, though that is a guaranteed downstream effect. The immediate danger is a loss of shared context. When the creators of technology live in a reality where “claudeswarms” run the day, they risk losing the ability to design for, or even empathize with, a world that is still fighting for permission to use the tools at all.

We are living in the same year, but we are no longer inhabiting the same time. The challenge for those of us on the “Inside” is to resist the intoxication of the bubble long enough to build bridges, rather than just building faster escape pods.

Meanwhile, in China (from the Financial Times)…

“I’ve witnessed first hand how China has grown from having zero AI talent 20 years ago to mass producing them,” he said. “Some of our most cutting-edge work is now done by fresh graduates. The real geniuses to change the world soon could well be among them.”