Categories
California Petroleum

The Last Tanker

There is a strange, quiet finality to the arrival of the New Corolla. It is a massive vessel, carrying two million barrels of crude—a literal, physical weight of energy—into the Port of Long Beach. It loaded up in Iraq on February 24th, just days before the world’s geopolitical plates shifted and the Strait of Hormuz effectively slammed shut.

By the time you read this, that oil will have been offloaded, refined, and moved into the capillaries of California’s infrastructure—into gas tanks, jet engines, and diesel generators.

And then, the silence begins.

California has long existed as an “energy island.” It is a geographic quirk that defines our modern life: we are disconnected from the domestic pipeline network that feeds the rest of the country. We don’t have the luxury of pulling from a pipeline in Texas or the Midwest. We are, by design, tethered to the horizon. We are dependent on the flow of tankers across the vast, deep blue of the Pacific.

For years, this worked. It was a invisible architecture of convenience. We consumed, and the tankers arrived with the metronomic precision of a clock. But the New Corolla is not just a delivery; it is a period at the end of a sentence. It represents the last of a supply chain that we assumed would be permanent.

When the analyst says, “all bets are off,” they aren’t just talking about prices at the pump or the logistical scrambling of refineries trying to source crude from Brazil or Guyana. They are describing the erosion of a certainty we didn’t realize we relied on. We have built a state—a massive, humming, technological engine—on the assumption that the world is a frictionless marketplace.

The crisis is not just about the supply of oil; it is the realization that we are fragile.

We look at our inventories, and we see them as a buffer. We are told they are “healthy,” but inventories are, by definition, a countdown. They are the water left in the glass after the tap has been turned off. We are now in the uncomfortable, interim phase where the supply lines are empty, and the new ones haven’t yet been built—or perhaps, cannot be built.

It is easy to look at this and see a political or economic failure. It is harder to see it as a human one. We have become experts at consuming the distant, while remaining strangers to the mechanics of that consumption. We have lived in the architecture of the “global everything,” and now, as the walls of that architecture contract, we are forced to look at the geometry of our own isolation.

The New Corolla will depart for distant waters. It will leave behind a void, and in that void, we will find out if our resilience is as robust as our rhetoric.

The future is only guaranteed for those who can afford to survive the present.

And for now, the present is a question of how much gasoline is left in the tank, how much jet fuel is available and how quickly we can learn to walk on our own.

Categories
Economics Energy History

Hoarding and Recession

While listening this afternoon to the latest edition of the Goodfellows podcast from the Hoover Institution I was reminded that I had been wanting to better understand the effects of hoarding behavior aggravating a situation such as the current conflict in the Middle East.

Wanting to explore this further I asked Grok the following:

I’m listening to this discussion about recessions: https://youtu.be/UIB-fCsXzgs?si=L5kXmubqZOtcKnsz

Something I’ve wondered about in the present moment with the Iran situation is the effect of hoarding.

What insights can you provide?

Here’s the response which I found very interesting:

Hoarding in the Iran Crisis: A Classic Shock Amplifier That Echoes the Podcast’s “Locusts and Pirates” Warning

You’re listening to exactly the right conversation. The Hoover Institution episode (just dropped today, March 25, 2026) with Tyler Goodspeed, Neil Ferguson, John Cochrane, and H.R. McMaster frames recessions as unpredictable “murders” by external shocks—locust plagues, pirate raids on shipping, coal strikes, or oil embargoes—rather than economies “dying of old age.”

The panel explicitly flags the ongoing Iran war as a live example: a potential energy shock via the Strait of Hormuz that could replay 1970s-style pain, especially if prolonged.

Hoarding is the behavioral multiplier they reference from history (panic coal buying in past shortages, 2020 toilet-paper runs), and right now it’s playing out in real time with the Iran situation.

Here’s a clear-eyed breakdown of its economic mechanics and recession implications.

The Current Iran Shock (as of March 25, 2026)

Since late February, U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran (including the assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei and hits on oil infrastructure) triggered Iranian retaliation: closure of the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on tankers, and disruption of ~20% of global seaborne oil and LNG. Oil prices spiked above $100/barrel (Brent briefly hit $120 in early March before partial pullback), European gas doubled in spots, and shipping has largely halted. The war is not over—Trump has signaled possible diplomacy, but Iran denies talks and continues missile activity—leaving markets in a state of fragile “wait-and-see” with elevated volatility.

This is precisely the kind of supply-side “Captain Hook” shock Goodspeed describes: physical disruption (not just fear) that raises input costs economy-wide.

How Hoarding Enters the Picture—and Why It Matters More Than People Realize

Hoarding here operates on three levels: national governments, corporations/refiners, and households. It’s rational self-protection in uncertainty, but collectively it turns a manageable disruption into a self-reinforcing spiral.

  • National-level hoarding (the big one right now): Asian importers (India, Bangladesh, Thailand, Philippines, Nepal, Pakistan) are already redirecting fuel from industry to households, imposing work-from-home orders, rationing cooking gas/LPG, shortening workweeks, and stationing troops at depots to prevent private hoarding. China—smartly—had pre-stocked ~1.4 billion barrels of crude before the war and is still buying aggressively. The result? A “mother of all bidding wars” for remaining supply, as one analyst put it. Even the U.S. and allies face pressure not to release Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) too quickly, because everyone else is scrambling. IEA has ordered record releases, but if countries hoard reserves instead of sharing, global tightness worsens.
  • Corporate and trader hoarding: Refiners and traders are filling tanks wherever possible. Storage in the Gulf is hitting capacity, forcing producers to cut output (a real supply loss, not just transport). This adds non-fundamental demand and delays the normal market rebalancing.
  • Household panic buying: So far limited in the U.S./Europe (no widespread gas-line scenes yet), but it shows up as higher gasoline demand in Asia and could spread if prices keep climbing. The podcast’s historical note on 20th-century coal hoarding (“a woman begging for extra deliveries”) is spot-on for how this cascades.

The Recession Feedback Loop: Hoarding as an Accelerator

Here’s where it ties directly to the episode’s thesis:

  1. Price spike + inflation pass-through → Oil at $100+ for weeks/months fans headline inflation (0.4–1% globally per IMF models if sustained). Central banks face a dilemma: hike rates (worsening slowdown) or hold (letting inflation embed). The podcast notes 1970s price controls and windfall taxes amplified this exact dynamic.
  2. Demand destruction via higher costs → Households and businesses cut discretionary spending (travel, manufacturing, retail). Asian emerging markets—already rationing—are seeing this hit hardest and fastest. In the U.S., Goldman Sachs just raised recession odds to 25% citing the oil upside risk on top of softer jobs/retail data.
  3. Financial and confidence channel → Bidding wars drain liquidity, raise borrowing costs, and erode business investment. The episode highlights how supply shocks often trigger internal monetary drains (banks pull back lending) and equity drops—exactly what we’re seeing in modest S&P pullbacks and VIX spikes.
  4. Duration matters (the “prolonged” risk) → Short war = modest 10–30¢/gallon gas bump, limited recession odds. Prolonged Hormuz closure = guaranteed global recession via hoarding-driven tightness, per multiple analysts. Storage refill demand (U.S. SPR alone needs ~450 million barrels) adds extra buying pressure even after fighting stops.

Goodspeed’s optimism—that modern economies are more diversified and expansions last longer—still holds, but only if policymakers avoid 1970s mistakes (controls, hoarding of reserves). Strategic releases and diplomacy can short-circuit the hoarding spiral.

Bottom line: Hoarding isn’t the root cause (the Strait closure is), but it’s the behavioral “locust swarm” that turns a geopolitical event into a broader economic shock.

The podcast is prescient here—watch how SPR policy and Asian rationing play out in the next 2–4 weeks. If the war de-escalates quickly, hoarding fades and the recession scare passes.

If not, we’re living the exact multi-causal downturn the panel is warning about.